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This paper provides a model of nonlinear income taxation in a context of inter-
national mobility. We consider two identical countries, in which each government
chooses non-cooperatively redistributive taxes.
It is shown that when skilled workers can move at low cost, the income taxa-
tion does not involve distortions. When the cost to move becomes high for skilled
workers, taxation policy is less redistributive but qualitatively similar to the taxation
policy in autarky. Moreover, the mobility of the unskilled workers does not affect the
income taxation when both countries have Rawlsian objectives.
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Onse place dans un cadre traditionnel de taxation optimale du revenu. Lapopulation est constituée
d'individus (qui sont à la fois contribuables et travailleurs) qui prennent des décisions quant à leur
consommation etleur travail. Lescontribuables peuvent changer depays etproter éventuellement
d'une scalité plus avantageuse à l'étranger.
Le premier résultat est que si les deux gouvernements ont des objectifs rawlsiens (ce qui
revient ici à maximiser l'utilité de l'individu le moins productif) les taxations d'équilibre sont
indépendantes de la faculté des individus non productifs à changer de pays.
Le second résultat est que la taxation optimale, si le coût de déplacement des individus les
plus productifs est assez faible, n'entraine pas de distortion dans l'offre de travail: les individus
travaillent comme s'il n'y avait aucune taxation.
Enn, si les gouvernments ne sont pas rawlsien, s'ils prennent en compte aussi le bien-être
des individus les plus productifs, alors les possibilités de déplacement des individus les moins
productifs vont aussi inuencer les taxations d'équilibre.
Keywords: Concurrence scale, Mobilité internationale, Taxation optimale.
JEL Classication: H21, H23, H77.1 Introduction
Common wisdom suggests that mobility across countries leads to a race-to-the-bottom:
generous countries will see their low-skilled population increase and in the same time
they their more skilled workers immigrate to escape hight tax rate. It will make redistri-
bution and social programs more difcult. Thus, any economic integration would cause
reduction in social programs, or less progressive tax schedules.Then one would conclude
that free migration constrains the shape of possible redistribution schemes for each gov-
ernment.
This effect of international competition when factor are mobile has been studied in
the literature1, especially for capital income taxation. The primary objective of this paper
is to provide a model of income tax competition between two countries when workers are
mobile.
Most papers on income tax competition focus on linear income taxes 2. We depart
from these papers by considering nonlinear income taxes. This makes the analysis more
complex and general results difcult to obtain. But, as shown by Diamond (1998), the
distribution of population between more or less skilled workers affects the shape of the
optimal income taxes. Therefore the possibility of migration may have different impacts
on marginal income rates set by the government, which cannot be seen if we consider
only linear income tax.
Optimal nonlinear taxation usually consists in transferring income from the rich to the
poor. In this context Bertrand competition between governments leads to a unsatisfactory
equilibrium: trying to attract skilled worker in order to increase tax revenue, each gov-
ernment has incentives to reduce the tax rate on high wages. If there is no restriction on
mobility, the laissez-faire is the only outcome of the competition game. Using Swiss
data Kirchgässner and Pommerehne (1996) show that scal competition has empirically
an impact. Their results strongly suggest that high income earners choose their place of
residence depending on the amount of income tax they have to pay. But they also show
that even if scal competition matters, there is no race to the bottom, geographically
close regions exhibiting very different taxation policies.
In the remainder of this paper, we will consider different restrictions on mobility and
their consequences on the equilibrium. Workers will have different costs to move, de-
pending on their preferences.
Hindriks (1999) provides a model close to ours. The author discusses the level of
redistribution when workers are imperfectly mobile. But it does not allow for imperfect
information between government and workers. Moreover, labor supply is taken as ex-
ogenous. On the contrary, we will focus on imperfect information. The closest paper is
1For a more detail survey, see Cremer, Fourgeaud, Leite-Monteiro, Marchand, and Pestieau (1996) or
Wilson (1999).
2See for examples Gordon (1983), Wildasin (1991) and Wildasin (1994).
1Hamilton, Lozachmeur, and Pestieau (2002) but it deals only with a particular case: the
governments are Rawlsian; the unskilled workers are perfectly mobile while the skilled
workers are perfectly immobile. They show that in that case international mobility does
not affect redistribution, which is a very intuitive result: a Rawlsian government has no
incentive to attract unskilled workers as long as it maximizes their per-person utility by
transferring them income, and it has incentives to attract skilled workers who pay taxes,
but in their model these skilled workers are immobile. Our paper generalizes this result.
Hamilton and Pestieau (2001) also study nonlinear income tax competition. They
consider both Rawlsian, despotic governments and majority voting outcomes under dif-
ferent assumption on the mobility of workers. But their assumptions on mobility are quite
restrictive: workers are perfectly mobile or perfectly immobile and both kinds of workers
cannot be mobile together. Moreover, they consider small open economies: each country
does not anticipate any effect of its own redistribution scheme on international migration.
Their governments are not strategic competitors. In the following we consider the op-
posite assumption. Our governments are strategic players who anticipate that their taxes
affect migration3.
From a technical point of view, this paper is close to Rochet and Stole (2002) which
analyses the competition between two principals in a duopoly framework with random
participation. In our model the cost of mobility plays the same role as the random partic-
ipation in limiting the effect of the Bertrand competition.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic framework of the
study. Section 3 provides the basic properties of the optimal taxation. Section 4 and
5 derive the properties of the competitive outcome under different assumptions on the
welfare criterion. Section 6 concludes. All the proof are moved in appendix.
2 Model
For tractability and for ease of comparison we adopt the discrete-skill setting of Stiglitz
(1982). We consider an economy with two kinds of agents: the workers (who are also
tax-payers) and two governments.
2.1 Workers
The workers are characterized by their identical preferences and some different abilities.








































the tax schedule set by the government. v is the disutility of labor
3Our model does not generalized Hamilton and Pestieau (2001)'s one. Both assumptions on strategic

















￿ 0. The ability is denoted by wk
￿
the (constant)








￿ , with w1
￿ w2.
Given that the labor market is competitive, the wages are equal to the marginal pro-
ductivitiesof workers, which implies I
￿
















We denote by p the proportion of skilled workers.




B. Workers can move (once) from their
nativecountry to the foreign country. For an worker of abilityk born in country A, the cost












￿ and sk a preference parameter depending upon the individual




1) is the least mobile. On the
contrary, a worker with x
￿
1 is the most mobile. So x can be interpreted as a personal
mobility parameter. The higher sk is, the less one worker with productivity wk is mobile,







is private information: it is only known by the worker. We assume




￿ . Moreover the whole population in each country is equal to 1.
2.2 Governments
The governments 4 are both benevolent. They have the same preferences over the util-






. We will consider two


































Therefore we restrict our analysis to welfare function which do not depends on the
proportion p. If we include p in the welfare function some strange effects may arrive:
attracting skilled workers may increase the total welfare even if utilities remain the same.
The second welfare function is not exactly the utilitarian social welfare function, it will
use to test the robustness of the results obtained in the Rawlsian case.
4We take the separation between the two countries as given. Obviously, the merge of the two govern-
ments would be welfare improving. For a discussion on principals separation, see Martimort (1999).
3The governments choose non-cooperatively their income tax schedule under a budget
constraint. The taxation has an unique purpose: redistribution from the rich to the
poor since the governments do not need to nance public goods 5.
2.3 Firms
Our resultsare derived assumingthat rms are competitive,and that the two types of labor
are perfect substitutes.
3 Autarky
The results presented in this section have rst been obtained by Stiglitz (1982). If we
consider a Rawlsian government, the function W does not depend on p, i.e. the distribu-
tion of type affects only the budget constraint. On the contrary, if we consider a weighted
utilitarian government, the distribution of type affects both the objective function of the
government and its budget constraint.
To characterize the optimal tax policy, we rely on a revelation mechanism. For
our purpose, a mechanism consist in a set of specic after-tax and before-tax income.










the welfare function under two


























































With some change of variables this program can also be written as



































































































-1 as the two before-tax incomes that would be optimal without























In the same way, we dene I
-
￿
- 1 and I
-
￿
- 2 as the two optimal before-tax incomes when
w1 and w2 are private information.
Proposition 1 (Mirrlees 1971, Stiglitz 1982) Let us consider a pure Rawlsian govern-
















are binding, and the labor supply (or the before-tax income) of the skilled workers

















The optimaltaxation exhibitsan importantfeature. The labor supplyof the less skilled
individual is distorted in order to reduce the incentives for the skilled to misreport their
type. It shapes the form of the tax function, which can not be convex everywhere. The
international mobility affects this property when the cost to move is sufciently low as it
shown in the following sections.
6We restrict our attention to interior solutions.
54 Rawlsian governments
First, we consider two Rawlsian governments. Each government chooses its tax function
taking the tax function of the other country as given and anticipating correctly the migra-
tions induced by taxes. Equilibrium is a xed point in which no worker wants to move
and no government wants to change its redistribution policy (given the policy of the other
country).
We adopt the Rothschild-Stiglitz-Nash concept of equilibrium. This could be contro-
versial since a government does not anticipate that after a deviation from equilibrium the
policy of the other government could not be sustainable. The budget constraint depends
on the proportions of both kinds of workers: after a migration from one country to the
other induced by a change in the scal policy of one country, the other country's budget
constraint is not balanced anymore.
We adopt this concept of equilibrium for mainly two reasons. First, there is no con-
sensus on an alternative denition of equilibrium. Second, we want to keep the Nash
equilibrium concept to be consistent with the usual assumption made in the economic
literature.
We solve this game by using the revelation principle: we assume that there is no
restriction in considering that both governments offer truthful mechanisms. In a more
general setting where we consider competition between two principals there is some loss
of generality in restricting the analysis to this set of mechanisms7.
In our context, the agent deals either one of the two principals, but he cannot deal with
the two simultaneously: a worker works and pays taxes in country A or in the country
B, any arbitrage is forbidden. In this case, Martimort and Stole (2002) argue that the
revelation principal applies, as long as we consider only pure strategy equilibria.












A worker with preference x (0
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In the same way, a worker with preference x and ability wk from A, moves if and only
if:
































The governments do not observe x, they cannot design mechanisms which reveal this
information. This property is a consequence of the additivity of the moving cost8. In this
context, the optimal mechanism is still a set of specic after-tax and before-tax income.
With a Rawlsian objective, the government B maximizes the utility of less productive
individuals. Since we can restrict our analysis to truthful mechanisms, we impose that










































The program of government B is the same its the program in the autarchy case, except



































































































































8If the mobility were not additively it would be possible to use taxation to make reveal x. Using random
taxation it would be also possible.








We restrict the analysis to symmetric equilibria.









none of the incentive constraints is binding: labor supplies are not














is binding: the labor supply of the
skilled worker is not distorted while the labor supply of the unskilled workers is
distorted.
 For any given s2, the tax policy does not depend on s1.








There are two regimes of taxation, depending on the value of s2. If it is small, tax
policiy does not involve distortion (Area ZA in gure 1). On the contrary, if s2 is large
enough, the tax polices are qualitatively similar to the tax policy in autarchy.
A government has three relevant constraints. First, the government must respect a
budget constraint. Second, the government has to leave enough rent to skilled workers





. But here the government has also to prevent migration of the skilled
workers (which is new with respect to the autarky case).
When s2 is small (moving from one country to the other is quite easy) only the third
constraint prevails: in order to prevent migration, the government leave enough rent to
the skilled workers, so skilled workers have no incentive to misreport their type. When
s2 becomes higher (greater than  s), it is less difcult to prevent migration, therefore
8the government leaves less rent to the skilled workers, which may incourage them to
misreport their type.
If we make extremes assumptions on mobility, we can deduce from this proposition
twointerestingcorollaries. First, if skilledindividualare immobile,e.i. s2 goestoinnity,


































Corollary 1 At equilibrium, when s2 goes to innity, the optimal tax policy does not
depends on s1, and does not differ from the autarky case.
This corollary is a generalization of Hamilton, Lozachmeur, and Pestieau (2002)'s
main result. The intuition of the result is the same. A Rawlsian government has no
incentive to attract unskilled workers: to maximize only their utility, they receive some
transfer from the government. If a unskilled worker moves from A to B, it means that
for a given tax revenue, each unskilled worker receives lower transfer. On the contrary,
a Rawlsian government has incentives to attract skilled workers who pay taxes, but here
they cannot move.





























and we can establish the following corollary:










none of the incentive constraints is binding, so labor supplies are not














is binding: the labor supply of skilled
workers is not distorted while the labor supply of unskilled individuals is distorted.
Each skilled worker pays a total income tax smaller than s2.
As in proposition 2, the tax policies do not depends on s1. The governments care only
about less skilled workers, so they only try to attract skilled workers.
95 Other welfare criterion
Proposition 2 contrasts with results obtained by Hindriks (1999) when we compare his
results on tax-transfer competition with ours. His optimal transfer policy depends on s1.
This important difference does not come from his assumption on information, but from
the objective of the governments. If we consider other welfare functions, we get optimal
tax policies which depends on s2 and s1. The following example shows this.

















































































none of the incentive constraints is binding: labor supplies are not










is binding: the labor supply of the skilled
worker is not distorted while the labor supply of the unskilled individuals is dis-


















where labor supplies are not distorted can be divided in
three subareas: ZA, ZB and ZC.
First the domain of values of s2 for which labor supplies are not distorted is enlarged:
the area ZB is added to ZA. The welfare of skilled workers affects social welfare, then it
is less costly for a government to reduce the tax on skilled workers to attract them.
Second, s1 now matters. In the autarchy case, a government would be better off with
less unskilled worker in its country: less unskilled workers means less taxes on skilled
workers (or higher transfer to the less skilled workers for a Rawlsian government). Then
when s1 is small a government has incentives to reduce transfer to the unskilled workers,
(which reduce their welfare) to make them move. The area ZC is added to ZA and ZB.
This strange behavior is due to the specication of the welfare function. Since it
does not depend on p, a government has the same utility whatever the number of poor
living in its country may be. As long as it cares about the welfare of the skilled workers
who are net taxpayers, for a given number of skilled worker, its welfare objective de-
creases with the number of unskilled workers for a given amount of their transfer, just
because it implies less taxes for skilled workers of a given number.
The conclusions from proposition 3 are twofold.
First, it shows that the neutrality of s1 holds no longer when we consider more general
welfare functions.
Second, it also shows the role of welfare criterion, which can imply counter-intuitive
and questionable behavior of governments.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown how mobility affects the possibility of redistribution, and the
shape of the taxation policy. The key variable in our analysis is the mobility of skilled
workers, who are the victims of redistribution. If they can move, they use the scal com-
petitionbetween the two governmentstoreduce their income tax rate. On the contrary, the
ability to move of the unskilled workers does not affect the optimal tax policy of Rawlsian
governments 9.
The secondimportantresultisthatwhenthe costtomoveof theskilledworker issmall
the equilibrium of the game leads to rst best allocations, i.e. efcient labor supplies. It
does not mean that scal competition has no effect on redistribution, which is on the
contrary reduced by this competition.
Finally, we have shown, using one particular example, the role of the welfare function.
If the government cares about the whole population, it may have some strange behavior,
such as to induce the less rich part of the population to migrate to other countries.
9The result would be exactly the contrary if we had consider despotic governments, i.e. government
who maximize the utility of the richest worker.
11Even if we use a standard model, some of our assumptions are restrictive.
First, all our results have been derived using two particular welfare functions. Using
more general welfare function would give intuitionon the robustness (or not) of the mains
conclusions of this paper. The role of the mobility played by skilled workers in our model
is due to the aim of the government, which is roughly speaking to take from the rich to
give to the poor. But the specication of the welfare function play a central role in our
model.
We have considered a tractable discrete-type model, but even in a traditional setting
discrete and continuous models are not strictly equivalent. In particular, rst best allo-
cation are sometimes implementable in a discrete type setting, which is not possible in
continuous setting.
The existence of non symmetric equilibria remains an open question. As long as we
have symmetric countries, focusing on symmetric equilibria makes sense. But a clear
possible extension would be to consider asymmetric countries, and then we would have
no reason to focus on symmetric equilibria.
As capital taxation is an important question in economic literature, introducing gener-
alized production function including capital as production factor and capital taxation (as
in Huber (1999)) would probably gives interesting results.
Finally, as we have stressed the importance of mobility cost for the skilled workers,
it would be interesting to try to get empirical estimations for this cost. This could have
interesting consequences for scal policy, for example Kirchgässner and Pommerehne
(1996) suggest that scal competition has a signicant effect in Switzerland, but this
could be much less important in European Union because of higher costs to move.
These issues are on our current research agenda.
References
CREMER, H., V. FOURGEAUD, M. LEITE-MONTEIRO, M. MARCHAND, AND
P. PESTIEAU (1996): Mobility and redistribution: a survey, Public Finance, 51,
325352.
DIAMOND, P. (1998): Optimal Income Taxation: An exemple with a U-shaped pattern
of optimal marginal tax rates, American Economic Review, 88, 8395.
GORDON, R. H. (1983): An optimal taxation approach to scal federalism, Quaterly
Journal of Economics, 98(4), 567585.
HAMILTON, J., J.-M. LOZACHMEUR, AND P. PESTIEAU (2002): Rawlsian government
and the race to the bottom, Economics Bulletin, 8(2), 16.
HAMILTON, J., AND P. PESTIEAU (2001): Optimal income taxation and the abil-
ity to distribution: implication for migration equilibria, mimeo, CORE, Université
Catholique de Louvain.
12HINDRIKS, J. (1999): The consequences of labour mobility for redistribution: tax vs.
transfer competition, Journal of Public Economics, 74, 215223.
HUBER, B. (1999): Tax competition and tax coordination in an optimum tax model,
Journal of Public Economics, 71, 441458.
KIRCHGÄSSNER, G., AND W. W. POMMEREHNE (1996): Tax hamonization and tax
competition in the European Union: Lessons from Switzerland, Journal of Public
Economics, 60, 351371.
MARTIMORT, D. (1999): Renegociationdesignwithmultipleregulator,JournalofEco-
nomic Theory, 88, 261293.
MARTIMORT, D., AND L. A. STOLE (2002): The revelation and delegation principles
in common agency games, Econometrica, 70(4), 16591673.
MIRRLEES, J. (1971): An Exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation, Re-
view of Economics Studies, 38, 175208.
PETERS, M. (2001): Common Agency and the Revelation Principle, Econometrica,
69(5), 13491372.
ROCHET, J.-C., AND L. A. STOLE (2002): Nonlinear pricing with random participa-
tion, Review of Economic Studies, 69(1), 277311.
STIGLITZ, J. (1982): Self-selection and Pareto efcient taxation, Journal of Public
Economics, 17, 213240.
WILDASIN, D. E. (1991): Income redistribution in a common labor market, American
Economic Review, 27, 757773.
(1994): Income redistribution and migration, Canadian Journal of Economics,
27, 637656.
WILSON, J. D. (1999): Theories of tax competition, National Tax Journal, 52(2), 269
304.
A Proof of Proposition 1



























13One easily check that l
￿
0 is impossible. Let us assume that d1





























The proof is similar if we consider a Rawlsian government.
B Proof of Proposition 2




























































Where d1, d2 and l are multipliers associated with the constraints. The rst order

























































































































































Given a value of UB1, and a value of UB2 we try to nd conditions on rst order
condition in order to have a best response.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































, we can conclude that the value of I1 given U2 is independent of


















































































































































































































, we sufciently increase U2 and decrease I1, will nd





































is well behaved, there is only one solution to the preceding equation such
thatU2
￿ U
- 2 and I1
￿ I
-1.































































































































The best response of country B is to adopt the same policy. By construction, I2, U1,

















1, equations dening I2,U1, I2, andU2 are the same
as in the autarky case. Thus income taxation is not inuenced by the labor mobility.
C Proofs of corollaries 1 and 2
The preceding arguments apply in both cases.
D Proof of Proposition 3
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The best response of country B is to adopt the same policy. It implies that skilled







































































































































































































































































































































one can write l as a functionof d2. We have two equations,
and then possible implicit solutions for I1 and d2.

























S 1 . In the same way,
if we set I1
￿
I














































































































goes to nite number when d2 goes to




is increasing with I1 and goes to 1 when I1
goes to innity.
Let us assume that d2























































































are continuous function, for I
-1
( I1































































ous fonction, for I1
% I




is well dene and continuous. We can deduce























































, and if the country A adopt the following describe in the proof, The best
response of country B is to adopt the same policy.
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